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1 Introduction
Motivation for the analysis. Not so long ago, there was a widespread conjecture
that gas prices around the world would converge. The idea was that sea-based trade
in liqueed natural gas (LNG) would connect regional markets notably Asia, Eu-
rope, and the US and thereby link their pricing. The volume of LNG trade has
indeed grown signicantly since the early 2000s, against the backdrop of liberal-
ization of electricity and gas industries, and an increase in demand for natural gas.
Global investment in LNG infrastructure liquefaction and regasication capacity
has risen, and such facilities are now spread across more countries. The size of the
LNG tanker eet has expanded signicantly, and transport costs have fallen.1
Importantly, too, contracting arrangements between buyers and sellers have be-
come more exible. Traditionally, an LNG project involves a bilateral long-term
contract, say of a 20-year duration, between a buyer and seller, to back up the
initial investment. However, there is an ongoing shift towards trade in spot and
short-term markets; these have increased ten-fold since 2000 and now make up 25%
of total LNG sales (GIIGNL, 2012).2 This development has been aided, amongst
other things, by the adoption of Master Sales Agreements for LNG, which create
standardization and reduce transaction costs.
Yet gas prices around the world have varied widely; signicant price di¤erentials
have existed for years, and have become more pronounced since the Fukushima
accident of March 2011 (IGU, 2013). The 2012 average natural gas price was roughly
US$16/MMBtu in Japan, $9 in Europe but only $3 in the US. Some expect large
price disparities to persist, including the International Energy Agency in modelling
scenarios for 2020 and 2035. In short, the gas market appears far from global.
For the case of the US, the reasons for price divergence are quite clear. First, the
1Useful overviews of the LNG industry as of the mid 2000s are provided by Jensen (2003) and
Yergin and Stoppard (2003), with a focus, respectively, on economics and geopolitics.
2Brito and Hartley (2007) argue that the expectation of a shift towards short-term multilateral
trading can have self-fullling properties.
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large-scale emergence of shale gas over the last few years has put strong downward
pressure on US natural gas prices. Second, the US at present only has very limited
LNG export capability; its infrastructure still reects the assumption of the 2000s
that the US would become a major LNG importer. As a result, the US market has
been largely isolated from the rest of the world.3
The other price gaps require a di¤erent explanation, and some industry observers
have argued they imply that LNG exporters have been behaving irrationally.
Several major LNG exporters make short-term sales to Asia but simultaneously
supply Northwest Europe at far lower prices. This behaviour may appear irrational
in that it entails a forgone prot = jprice di¤erentialj  quantity sold to the lower-
priced market. For Qatari short-term sales to the UK, rather than to Japan, some
estimates suggest a forgone prot of up to $100 million per day (in late 2011), and
a cumulative gure in the billions over the period from April 2011 to April 2012.
(These deliveries are estimated as 75% higher than contractual obligations.) LNG
producers have, apparently, been failing to engage in price arbitrage by not exiting
the European market (at least for short-term sales).
The most immediate explanation for price divergence lies in transport costs. In
particular, a simple perfectly competitive model predicts that the price di¤erence
across two regions served by an exporter equals the di¤erence in the associated
transport costs. Put di¤erently, the netback that is, price minus transport cost
for the exporter should be the same for each region.
The problem with this theory is that it cannot explain the kinds of price dif-
ferences observed over the last years. Consider again the case of Qatar, the largest
LNG producer with a global market share of around 30%, and its sales to Japan
and UK, the two largest routes of short-term LNG, with global shares of 10% and
6% respectively (GIIGNL, 2012). Figure 1 shows the di¤erential between the Platts
JKM (Japan Korea Marker) spot price for Asian LNG and the UK NBP (National
3Several LNG liquefaction facilities are currently under development or pending US regula-
tory/political approval.
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Figure 1: Qatar LNG sales to Japan vs UK Di¤erences in gas prices compared to
di¤erences in transport costs
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Balancing Point) hub price, plotted against the di¤erence in transport costs between
shipping from Qatar to Japan and Qatar to the UK, respectively.4,5 Prices are up
to $10/MMBtu higher in Asia than in the UK, while the corresponding transport
costs are approximately identical. Perfect competition, by contrast, predicts that
these two di¤erentials should coincide.6
The perfectly competitive model cannot account for other producersbehaviour.
For example, Peru is in a similar position to Qatar in that its Europe-Asia transport-
cost di¤erentials are usually very small (Platts, 2012), and yet it makes short-term
4Platts JKM reects the spot price of LNG in Japan and South Korea, reported as a single
market-wide number. In practice, there may be some variation in prices for di¤erent buyer-seller
pairings, but information on such individual transactions is generally unavailable. Also widely
reported is an LNG price based on the Japanese Crude Cocktail (JCC); this reects oil-linked pric-
ing formulae that underlie long-term supply contracts rather than spot trades for uncommitted
LNG on which this paper focuses. See Stern (2012) for a detailed overview of how gas-pricing
mechanisms vary across regions, including on Asian gas price formation.
5Source: Calculations based on data from Platts, Poten & Partners, and ICAP (via Bloomberg).
6This theoretical prediction should not be taken too literally. Temporary deviations are to be
expected in the face of short-term demand and supply shocks. However, large price divergences
persisting for several years are di¢ cult to reconcile with this theory.
The simple theory also fails to explain the data on two broader counts. First, over large parts of
the sample period (early 2010 until early 2013) it even predicts the wrong sign: transport costs to
the UK are typically slightly higher than to Japan, while prices are much lower. Second, there is
excess volatility: transport costs are far too stable to be able to explain the observed volatility
of (relative) gas prices.
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sales to both markets (GIIGNL, 2012). For other major producers, such as Nigeria
and Trinidad & Tobago, transport costs to Asia are indeed higher (by around $2
3.50/MMBtu) but still often not su¢ cient to explain observed sales and prices.
Overview of the results. In this paper, we instead suggest that regional price
di¤erentials arise because of LNG exportersmarket power. Consider a producer who
can sell uncommitted LNG into two export markets. In general, prot-maximization
implies that the producer equalizes marginal revenue, net of the marginal cost of
production and transport, across the two markets. If transport costs are identical
as is roughly the case for Qatars sales to the UK and Japan then export quantities
are such that marginal revenues for each region are equal.
The key point is simply that equalizing marginal revenue is not necessarily the
same thing as equalizing price. Put di¤erently, for an exporter with market power,
the arbitrage process stops when its marginal revenues are equalized; this may
optimally leave prices across markets far apart. This argument extends straightfor-
wardly to more than two export markets and to capacity constraints on production;
moreover, it does not depend on any particular mode of strategic competition (such
as Cournot-Nash competition).7
We provide a simple new formula for relative prices between any two export
markets, in terms of a sellers transport costs and price elasticities of demand. It
deals with a key challenge the shortage of available data on LNG markets. In
particular, our basic approach does not rely on production cost data, or on any
assessment of whether or not an exporter is capacity-constrained. Also, while our
exposition focuses on gas and LNG, it will become clear that our approach and
results could also nd application in other contexts, including other commodity
markets as well as settings with di¤erentiated products.
Market power can thus rationalize observed gas prices and trade ows by tracing
7We do not suggest that LNG producers are colluding, but rather that at least some of them
have a degree of market power (i.e., are not textbook price-takers) in some of their export markets.
See Egging, Holz, von Hirschhausen and Gabriel (2009) for a recent analysis of Gas OPEC.
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them to local demand conditions. The Fukushima accident, for instance, e¤ectively
switched o¤ large parts of Japanese nuclear power, leading to an increase in demand
for imported LNG to ll the gap. (Local demand conditions play no role in the
competitive model, in which price di¤erences are solely driven by transport costs.)
Our rough empirical estimates for Qatar yield Lerner indices (price-cost mark-ups)
of around 63% for short-term LNG sales to Japan compared to 33% for sales to the
UK (in 2012). We discuss in detail how di¤erent features of the LNG market limit
the ability and/or incentive of other players (such as LNG buyers and third-party
traders) to engage in price arbitrage, including constraints in LNG shipping.
We can o¤er a perspective on the possibility that the US will become a large
LNG exporter over the coming years. What is the likely impact on gas prices?
Our analysis makes clear that US and non-US prices will not necessarily converge
as a result, even allowing for transport costs. It also suggests that any model of
the e¤ect of US LNG exports is likely to be incomplete if it does not take market
power into account. For example, an inuential recent model-based simulation for
the US Department of Energy incorporates general-equilibrium e¤ects but assumes
that LNG producers do not respond strategically to US market entry.8
Our model of price discrimination with imperfect competition is static and thus
does not explicitly capture intertemporal features of the gas market (such as stor-
age).9 In practice, there may be a dynamic interaction between short-term prices
and long-term contracts. (Our model examines pricing incentives in short-term mar-
kets, taking long-term commitments as given.) In particular, a large proportion of
LNG imports is still governed by long-term contracts whose terms may be renego-
tiated from time to time. Some producers may have been reluctant to push down
short-term prices in Asia insofar as this would make it more di¢ cult to sustain
8NERA (2012) assumes Qatar is largebut does not alter its production strategy in response to
US exports, while other producers are represented as a competitive fringe; the model is augmented
with (exogenous) mark-up adjustments in order to be able to replicate observed regional gas prices.
9See Chaton and Durant-Viel (2013) for a recent analysis of the value of gas storage when rms
have market power.
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highprices on long-term contracts in the future. At its core, this argument has
a similar avour to ours; while our model is based on exportersmarket power in
short-term markets, this argument is essentially about exportersbargaining power
in negotiations of long-term contracts.
Related literature. A number of empirical papers have examined price conver-
gence in natural gas markets, though few of these focus specically on LNG. Siliv-
erstovsa et al. (2005) obtain mixed results from a cointegration analysis using data
from the early 1990s until 2004; they nd evidence for market integration between
European and Japanese markets, but no integration between North America and
Japan. Over the period 1999 to 2008, Neumann (2009) nds increased convergence
of gas spot prices between North America and Asia.10 Others have focused on price
convergence within regional markets; for example, Doane and Spulber (1994) em-
ploy similar techniques to nd an integrated, national market for natural gas in the
US. By contrast, we o¤er an economic-theory perspective on price non-convergence,
including a view to explaining observed prices since March 2011.
There are also several recent simulation-based models of gas-market integration
in the EU, see, e.g., Holz, von Hirschhausen and Kemfert (2008) and Lise and
Hobbs (2009). Newbery (2008) examines the impact of carbon pricing on mar-
ket power in the EU gas market (but does not consider LNG trade). In related
work, Growitsch, Hecking and Panke (2013) analyze the impact of disruptions in
the LNG supply chain at the Strait of Hormuz on regional market outcomes, and
also emphasize market power in the Japanese market. We also employ the standard
non-cooperative approach to pricing strategies; see Hubert and Ikkonikova (2011)
for a recent application of cooperative game theory to bargaining and investment in
natural gas markets.
Finally, there is related literature on market power in crude oil which estimates
10There does not appear to be any econometric analysis of gas-price convergence post-2011.
We conjecture that international price correlations have declined signicantly (compared to the
mid/late 2000s), and that the Fukushima accident represents a structural break.
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the level of market competitiveness with a particular emphasis on the role of OPEC,
see, e.g., Salant (1976), Almoguera, Douglas and Herrera (2011), and Nakov and
Nuño (2013). Most oil models simply assume a single global oil price; indeed,
international price di¤erentials in crude oil are typically small and mainly reect
quality di¤erences between oil varieties from di¤erent regions. In contrast, this paper
focuses on natural gas, for which the existing literature and the market is much
less well-developed; it obtains results that apply for a wide range of competitive
conditions, and focuses explicitly on the limits to price arbitrage in LNG.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of pricing across
di¤erent export markets, and gives some empirical estimates for the case of Qatar.
Section 3 provides a detailed discussion of limits to arbitrage in global LNG markets.
Section 4 o¤ers concluding remarks on the potential e¤ects of more LNG arbitrage,
in the future, on prices, industry prots, and social welfare and thereby highlights
several shortcomings of the existing literature on third-degree price discrimination.
2 A prot-maximizing LNG exporter
Setup of the model. Consider an LNG producer selling output into M  2
export markets. Let pk` (x
k
` ; y
k
` ; X
 k
` ; Y
 k
` ;`) denote the inverse demand function
producer k faces in market ` (` = 1; ::;M), where pk` is the spotprice of LNG,
xk` is the quantity sold by the producer in the short-term market, while y
k
` is the
quantity the producer has pre-committed to sell in market ` by way of long-term
contracts (which we here take as given). Analogously, X k` is the vector of outputs
sold by other producers in the spot market while Y  k` captures their long-term
commitments.11 Other factors that a¤ect demand in market ` are summarized by
the vector `. For example, this might include prices of pipeline-based gas, coal, oil
11From a buyers point of view, LNG from short-term markets and long-term contracts may be
imperfect substitutes.
8
and other substitutes, the business cycle, other demand shocks, and the weather.12
In the interest of generality, the model allows but does not require prices to
be producer-specic, that is, for there to be more than a single price in a market.
Most existing analyses of natural gas markets assume a single price in each market,
and all our modelling results hold for such situations (by setting pk` = p`). Our
model can also apply to situations in which there is price variation within a market,
e.g., because of quality di¤erentials between the products of various sellers, which
could be due to di¤erences in the energy content of delivered gas.
The producers cost function Ck(
PM
`=1(x
k
` + y
k
` )) depends on the sum of total
quantities sold in all M export markets, including spot market sales as well as long-
term commitments. Production may be subject to a capacity constraint such thatPM
`=1(x
k
` + y
k
` )  Q
k
.13 In addition to this, the producer incurs a market-specic
transport cost  k` per unit of output sold to market `.
14 This mainly reects the cost
of shipping and may vary across export markets depending on distance and other
factors (and also vary across di¤erent producers).
Our analysis here assumes that the LNG producer has access to shipping at the
respective transport costs; this is an appropriate assumption for major exporters
such as Qatar. We return to the question of access to the LNG tanker in our
discussion of limits to price arbitrage by other parties in Section 3.
Producer ks prot-maximization problem is to choose the amount of LNG to
export to each market, given any long-term commitments already entered into:
max
fxk`gM`=1
k =
PM
`=1 p
k
`x
k
`   Ck(
PM
`=1(x
k
` + y
k
` )) 
PM
`=1 
k
`x
k
`
subject to
PM
`=1(x
k
` + y
k
` )  Q
k
.
12Some of these factors may a¤ect individual producers in di¤erent ways, and some may inuence
demand conditions in several export markets.
13Adding a production constraint in terms of minimum throughput to ensure smooth operation
(must run),
PM
`=1(x
k
` + y
k
` )  Qk, would not a¤ect the following results.
14The results would remain unchanged with an a¢ ne transport cost function of the form T` +
k`x
k
` , where T` represents a xed cost.
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We assume, without much loss of additional economic insight, that this problem
is well-behaved with an interior solution for each of the M export markets.15 The
Langrangean for constrained optimization can be written as Lk = k + k(Q
k  PM
`=1(x
k
` + y
k
` )), where 
k  0 is the shadow value of the capacity constraint (i.e.,
the value of an incremental relaxation of the capacity constraint), which is non-zero
if the producer is capacity-constrained and zero if it is not.
Prot-maximization analysis. The optimal output choice bxk` by producer k in
market ` satises the rst-order conditionMRk`  MCk  k`  k = 0, whereMRk` is
marginal revenue from short-term sales, andMCk is the marginal cost of production.
Using the rst-order conditions for any two export markets, say i and j, shows that
these are related by
MRki    ki = MRkj    kj .
This is the fundamental condition for prot-maximization. The cost of an additional
unit of output is the same regardless where it ends up being sold, both in terms
of the marginal cost of production and the shadow value of using the capacity
elsewhere. (This holds regardless of whether or not the producer is, in fact, capacity-
constrained.) To maximize prots, therefore, the producer balances at the margin
the contribution of each export market in terms of sales revenue and transport costs.
So marginal revenue net of transport costs is equalized across export markets.
Marginal revenue in market ` can be written as MRk` = p
k
`
 
1  1=k`

, where
k` is the own-price elasticity of producer ks demand (alternatively, the elasticity of
its residual demand). From here on, this elasticity is understood to be evaluated at
producer ks optimally chosen output bxk` , as well as at the actual levels of short-term
15We are interested in explaining prices associated with empirically observed non-zero trade ows
to particular markets rather than working out which markets a producer should in fact be selling
to, and which ones not. For expositional purposes, we therefore focus on the M  2 markets to
which positive sales occur, rather than the general problem where the seller may choose to sell to
only M markets of a total number of M 0 > M possible markets. In any case, our fundamental
conditions for prot-maximization also apply in the general problem to any markets which the
producer does in fact choose to sell to.
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output of other producers and corresponding actual long-term commitments, that
is, k` = 
k
` (bxk` ; yk` ; X k` ; Y  k` ;`).16
Proposition 1 A prot-maximizing producer k sells into M  2 export markets
with a common marginal cost (and possibly subject to a capacity constraint):
(A) In any two markets i and j, prot-maximizing prices (pki ; p
k
j ) satisfy
(pki   pkj )
pkj
=
ki 
ki   1
 " 1
ki
  1
kj
!
+
 
 ki    kj

pkj
#
,
where ( ki ; 
k
j ) are transport costs and (
k
i ; 
k
j ) are own-price elasticities of demand;
(B) Any observed prices (pki ; p
k
j ) and transport costs (
k
i ; 
k
j ) in markets i and j can
be rationalized by some values for the price elasticities of demand (ki ; 
k
j ).
Proof. For (A), rewrite the fundamental equation for prot-maximization MRki  
 ki = MR
k
j    kj using the expression MRkl = pkl
 
1  1=k`

for l = i; j to obtain
pki
 
ki   1

ki
   ki = pkj
 
kj   1

kj
   kj
=) (pki   pkj )
 
ki   1

ki
= pkj
" 
kj   1

kj
 
 
ki   1

ki
#
+
 
 ki    kj

=) (pki   pkj )
 
ki   1

ki
= pkj
 
1
ki
  1
kj
!
+
 
 ki    kj

,
from which the result for the relative price (pki   pkj )=pkj follows immediately.
For (B), observe that ks rst-order condition for market i,MRki MCk  ki k = 0,
can be rewritten, again using MRki = p
k
i
 
1  1=k`

, to give
pki =
ki 
ki   1
  ki +  MCk + k
=) (pki    ki ) =
1 
ki   1
  ki + ki  MCk + k,
16A necessary condition for prot-maximization is that producer demand remains price-elastic
in each market, k` > 1. (Otherwise the producer could protably reduce output.) Market-level
demand elasticities can be signicantly lower; see also our discussion near the end of this section.
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which decreases in the elasticity ki , and hence satises (p
k
i  ki ) 2
 
MCk + k

;1
given the limiting cases, respectively, of ki ! 1 and ki ! 1. So any price and
transport cost satisfying pki   ki can be rationalized for some marginal production
(shadow) cost
 
MCk + k
  0 and an appropriately chosen elasticity ki . The same
argument applies for market j.
Understanding prot-maximizing prices. The formula for relative prices from
(A) is rather general: it does not rely on any specic functional-form assumptions
on demand and cost functions (e.g., linear, constant-elasticity, etc.), or on a partic-
ular form of competitive conduct in each export markets. Commonly-used models,
e.g., perfect competition, monopoly, Cournot-Nash oligopoly, dominant rm with a
competitive fringe, etc., are nested as special cases; the mode of competition may
di¤er across export markets.17 An informational advantage is that it does not fea-
ture production costs. (The result also does not assume that either consumers or
other producers are payo¤-maximizers; their behaviour, rational or otherwise, is
fully captured by the producers own-price elasticities of demand across markets.)
To understand the properties of the model, consider a few special cases:
First, the simple perfectly competitive model is nested where the producers
demand elasticity k` ! 1 in each export market ` = 1; ::;M . This corresponds to
a situation in which the producer is a price taker without any market power (so its
marginal revenue is equal to the market price in each market). Prices in any two
markets satisfy
 
pki   pkj

=
 
 ki    kj

, and netbacks are equalized.
Second, suppose that the equilibrium values of the price elasticities of demand
in two exports market are identical, ki = 
k
j = b < 1. Then the expression for
the price di¤erential becomes
 
pki   pkj

=
 
 ki    kj
b= (b   1). Relative to perfect
competition, (symmetric) market power thus exacerbates any price di¤erential across
export markets that is due to transport costs.
17Although we do not emphasize this aspect here, the same result would also apply to the two-
stage setting of Allaz and Vila (1993), where rms, in the rst stage, can commit to selling output
in forward markets, and, then, in the second stage, choose their production levels.
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Third, assume that transport costs to two markets are identical,  ki = 
k
j = b .
Relative price then satises
 
pki   pkj

=pkj =
 
kj   ki

=
 
ki   1

kj so p
k
i > p
k
j if and
only if ki < 
k
j . This shows that (i) prices can diverge across markets for reasons
of market power, not transport costs, and that (ii) strongermarkets, in which a
producer faces a lower price elasticity of demand, have higher prices.
Fourth, if price elasticities and transport costs across two markets satisfy ki  kj
and  ki   kj , then prices must satisfy pki  pkj . Intuitively, market i is far-and-
strong, with greater market power as well as higher costs, while market j is near-
and-weak. If either of these relationships is strict, then pki > p
k
j .
A model with market power can thus explain a far greater range of observed
prices than the simple competitive model. Most importantly, transport costs are
no longer the sole driver of price di¤erentials; relative demand conditions across
export markets now also play a key role. It relaxes the strong restriction that
sign
 
pki   pkj

= sign
 
 ki    kj

, and can also feature excess volatility in prices,
by going beyond the implication from the competitive model that var
 
pki   pkj

=
var
 
 ki    kj

.
While the present paper focuses on global gas pricing, the result from Proposition
1 could also nd application in other settings, both commoditymarkets and those
in which rmsproducts are signicantly di¤erentiated.
Rationalizing observed prices. Part (B) of the result is that the model with
market power can rationalize any observed price di¤erences between export markets.
The reason is as follows. Appropriate choice of the price elasticity for market ` can
generate any non-negative price-cost margin, ranging from zero (when k` !1) to
arbitrarily large (when k` ! 1), regardless of the underlying details of the producers
costs. (A negative price-cost margin cannot be prot-maximizing in the present
model.) So it is always possible to nd an elasticity to rationalize the observed price
in any market, and thus also to generate correct relative prices across markets.
Consider a numerical example based on LNG sales to Asia and Northwest Europe
13
(i = Asia, j = NW Europe). Let prices pki = 16 and p
k
j = 9, and assume, for
simplicity, that transport costs for producer k are identical,  ki = 
k
j = b . Such
prices can thus be explained by the producer having relatively greater market power
in Asia, that is, ki < 
k
j . Indeed, it is not di¢ cult to check that these relative prices
can be rationalized by a pair of elasticities ki = 2 and 
k
j = 9. (Note that the precise
value of b does not matter for this to hold.) Clearly, similar examples can also be
constructed to explain the behaviour of other producers in other markets, including
for cases where  ki 6=  kj .
Note that the above move from the modelling results to real-world data implies
an assumption that there is a single price in each regional market, i.e., each seller
receives the same price. In particular, our price data in form of the Platts JKM
price as well as the UK NBP price come as a single number for each of the two
respective markets (at each point in time). Such single prices do not capture any
price variation across di¤erent buyer-seller pairings, so a law of one priceholds
within each market. Recall, however, that that our theoretical argument does not
hinge upon this.18
Thus recent claims that major LNG exporters are acting irrationally by simul-
taneously selling short-term cargoes to both Northwest Europe and Asian markets
are not necessarily correct. It can be entirely rational for a prot-maximizing seller
to pursue a strategy that leaves prices in Japan far higher, in response to stronger
demand. In e¤ect, it uses sales to Europe to keep prices in Asia high.19
Why might producers have greater market power in Asia, notably Japan? The
Fukushima accident e¤ectively switched o¤ large parts of Japanese nuclear power,
leading to an increase in demand for imported LNG so as to ll the gap. From
the viewpoint of an individual LNG seller with a degree of market power, under
18In this sense, our empirical analysis is more restrictive than our theoretical model. The as-
sumption of single price in each regional market seems a good assumption for hub-based markets,
for example, in Northwest Europe, but probably more restrictive for less liquid markets in Asia.
Unfortunately, we do not have access to data on individual transactions.
19It is also economically ine¢ cient in that di¤erent consumers are paying di¤erent prices for
essentially the same good (so their marginal utilities are unequal).
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fairly general conditions, an upward shift in market demand (captured formally by
a change in i) translates into a lower price elasticity of demand. This, in turn,
typically leads to an increase in quantity of LNG supplied but also to an increase in
its price, as is consistent with market experience since Fukushima.20
To illustrate, consider a Cournot-Nash model of export market i in which N i  2
rms face a common demand curve pi(Xi; i) = i+fi(Xi), whereXi 
P
k x
k
i , and i
shifts consumerswillingness-to-pay, and suppose producer k has constant marginal
cost MCk.21 The rst-order condition for k is MRki   MCk    ki = 0, where
MRki = [i + fi(Xi)] + f
0
i(Xi)bxki < pi. Summing over all rms and rearranging gives
N i[i + fi( bXi)] + f 0i( bXi) bXi = PkMCk +Pk  ki . Di¤erentiating with respect to a
positive demand shock di > 0 shows that equilibrium demand/imports rise since
d bXi
di
=
N ih
 f 0i( bXi)i h(N i + 1) + bXif 00i ( bXi)=f 0i( bXi)i > 0,
where the denominator is positive by the stability of equilibrium. The market price
responds according to dpi=di = @pi=@i + (@pi=@Xi)jXi= bXi (d bXi=di), so, using
@pi=@i = 1 and @pi=@Xi = f 0i(Xi), we obtain
dpi
di
=
1 + bXif 00i ( bXi)=f 0i( bXi)h
(N i + 1) + bXif 00i ( bXi)=f 0i( bXi)i .
So the condition for price to rise and producer-specic elasticities to fall is:
dpi
di
> 0() d
k
i
di
< 0 (for all k) ()
bXif 00i ( bXi)
f 0i( bXi) >  1.
20Another potential explanation albeit one rejected by the available data is that capacity
constraints in an importing countrys regasication infrastructure drive price above marginal cost.
This could explain regional price divergences even in the absence of market power. At a global
level, however, the rate of capacity utilisation of regasication terminals has been stable, and rather
low, at around 40% since 2000. In Japan, annual LNG imports increased by 24% between 2010
and 2012 without signicant capacity additions; indeed utilisation rates rose only moderately up to
49%. Utilisation is higher for some importing countries, notably China and India, but at a similar
or lower level for other such as Argentina, Korea and the UK. (All based on data in IGU, 2013.)
21For simplicity, this illustration assumes away long-term contracts and third-party arbitrage
with other markets (although the points made would apply more generally).
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The latter condition requires that demand is not too convex(around equilibrium)
and is satised, for example, by any linear or concave demand curve. More formally,
it corresponds to log-concavity of demand, that is, the direct demand curve is
such that logDi(pi) is concave in price, which is a common assumption in economic
theory. In this sense, higher demand exacerbates sellersmarket power. By contrast,
in a competitive market dpi=di = 0, given constant returns to scale.22
More generally, it is frequently suggested that Asian buyers are more concerned
about security of supply than European buyers. This translates into a higher
willingness-to-pay for a unit of LNG and, all else equal, lower elasticities. Further-
more, Asian buyers have fewer possibilities to substitute for LNG, notably because
of more limited access to Russian pipeline gas.
Estimating producer-specic demand elasticities. A feature of the above
model is that the pair of elasticities to rationalize the data is, in general, not unique.
In the above numerical example, the data pki = 16, p
k
j = 9, and 
k
i = 
k
j = b are
rationalized for any pair of elasticities (ki ,
k
j ) that satises (1 ki =kj )=(ki  1) = 79 .
Setting (ki ,
k
j ) = (2; 9) is but one solution; setting (
k
i ,
k
j ) = (1
1
2
; 2 5
11
) is another.
Loosely put, getting the relative elasticities across markets correct matters more
than their absolute values. Note, however, that certain bounds on elasticities must
be satised. To see this, let  ki = 
k
j = b , and, suppose, without loss of generality
that pki > p
k
j . To be able to rationalize these data, the producer-specic elasticity
for market i must be su¢ ciently low in that ki < p
k
i =(p
k
i   pkj ).
Pinning down unique values for the elasticities requires more information and/or
additional modelling assumptions. We here discuss two approaches, which may be
substitutes or complements, and give some rough estimates of Qatars market power.
First, recall that the above results did not rely on production cost informa-
22For competitive markets with (strictly) upward-sloping supply curves, we would have dpi=di >
0. But then the price/demand increase in market i would, in equilibrium, increase marginal cost for
all other markets, such that dpj=di = dpi=di > 0 (for all j 6= i). So equilibrium price di¤erentials
(pi   pj) = ( i    j) between any two markets remain unchanged.
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tion, or on any knowledge of whether the producer is, in fact, capacity-constrained.
However, if such information is available, this immediately identies the producer-
specic demand elasticity. To see this, rewrite the rst-order condition for prot-
maximization in market `, using the relationship MRk` = p
k
`
 
1  1=k`

, to obtain
ki = p
k
i =

(pki    ki )  (MCk + k)

. In addition to prices (pki ,p
k
j ) and transport
costs ( ki ,
k
j ), knowledge of (MC
k + k) would identify each of the elasticities, ki
and kj , and yield a unique way of rationalizing the data. In the above numerical
example, for instance, knowledge thatMCk+k = 6 would select (ki ,
k
j ) = (2; 9) as
the unique solution. Perhaps most realistically, an assessment that the producer is
not capacity-constrained, i.e., k = 0, together with data on (pk` ,
k
` ,MC
k) identies
k` for each individual market.
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We here present some illustrative results for the case of Qatari exports to Japan
and the UK during 2012 (pki = 16, p
k
j = 9). These are based on indicative cost
estimates in IEA (2009), which give the combined unit cost of production, liquefac-
tion, and regasication of LNG at around $3.00/MMBtu in 2008 US$.24,25 We here
assume that Qatar is not capacity-constrained (k = 0), and take this estimate as
a proxy for its marginal cost. To account for possible cost ination between 2008
and 2012, we employ MCk = 3:90 (corresponding to year-on-year cost increases
of just under 7%). For transport costs, we rely on the data used above and set
 ki = 2:10 for Japan, and 
k
j = 2:15 for the UK market (based on 2012 averages).
Taken together, this information yields estimates of the producer-specic elastici-
ties ki = 1
3
5
and kj = 3
3
59
. These can be equivalently expressed as Lerner indices
(price-cost margins) of Lki 

(pki    ki ) MCk

=pki = (
k
i )
 1 ' 63% for Japan and
Lkj = (
k
j )
 1 ' 33% for the UK. We emphasize that these market-power estimates
23Put di¤erently, for each seller, there areM rst-order conditions butM+2 unknowns, namely,
k`
	M
`=1
, MCk, and k, but sinceMCk+k is a su¢ cient statistic for (MCk; k) the system boils
down to M + 1 unknowns.
24IEA (2009) is the only publicly available source of (fairly) recent (and only indicative) LNG
cost data we have been able to access.
25The unit cost of production for Qatar is estimated to be close to zero, as project costs are
taken to be covered by the output of gas condensate and other liquids, so the large bulk of costs
stems from liquefaction and regasication.
17
are only indicative; however, even accounting for potential shortcomings in the as-
sumptions and data, it seems clear that (i) price-cost margins are signicant for
both markets, and (ii) margins are considerably higher in Japan than for the UK.
Second, it may be possible to justify more specic assumptions on competitive
conduct. For instance, it is quite common in the analysis of natural gas markets
to assume Cournot-Nash competition between sellers. Then an individual producer
ks demand elasticity k` = i=s
k
i , where i is the price elasticity of market demand
and sk` 2 (0; 1) is the producers market share in the appropriately dened market
`. Conditional on settling the issue of market denition, data on market shares are
generally easier to obtain, and it is usually easier to estimate a market-level elasticity
than a producer-specic elasticity (or a set of producer elasticities).
This second approach can act as a substitute for the previous production-cost
approach, namely as an alternative way of pinning down the precise value of k` for
each seller in each market. But it can also be used in conjunction with the rst
approach to test the validity of particular models of competition. More specically,
it could be used to (i) provide a direct estimate, even in the absence of any data on
prices or costs, of k` for a producer-market pairing; (ii) select a preferred pair from
the set of producer-specic elasticities (ki ,
k
j ) obtained using our basic model which
utilizes data on prices and transport costs; (iii) test whether a particular model of
competition, say Cournot-Nash, is consistent with the values of (ki ,
k
j ) obtained by
our rst approach using production-cost information.
To illustrate using our numerical example from above, suppose it is estimated
that two markets have identical overall price elasticities i = j =
1
2
(say for natural
gas, obtained both via LNG and pipelines where available); the producer-specic
elasticities (ki ,
k
j ) = (2; 9) would then be generated by producer k having mar-
ket shares (ski ,s
k
j ) = (25%; 5
5
9
%) respectively in the two markets. Alternatively, if
the producer had identical market shares ski = s
k
j = 10%, then the corresponding
market-level elasticities would be (i,j) = (
1
5
; 9
10
).
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To summarize, we have presented a basic model that requires only minimal
information on prices and transport costs. This model can be augmented using
additional input data on production costs and/or competitive conditions.26 We have
derived some illustrative estimates of Qatars short-term market power in Japan
and the UK. It is clear that the general methodology could easily be applied to
other producers and trade routes insofar as su¢ cient data were available to the
analyst. We return to the impact of price discrimination under di¤erent competitive
conditions in our concluding remarks below.
3 Limits to price arbitrage in LNG markets
Our model o¤ers an explanation for why it may be optimal for prices across regions
to be di¤erent from the viewpoint of an LNG producer. Implicit in the model, as in
virtually all literature on price discrimination, is that other players do not undermine
this sales strategy. We here discuss a number of reasons, many particular to LNG
markets, that either limit the ability of other players to engage in arbitrage or create
incentives that work against pursuing arbitrage in the rst place.
The textbook assumption that sustains price discrimination by a seller is that
buyers cannot engage in resale. Although there is a trend towards more exible
LNG contracting arrangements, some destination restrictionsappear to persist.
For example, it is said that state-controlled LNG producers still normally restrict
the resale of their exports in a way that prevents secondarytrading on commodity
exchanges. This means that some price arbitrage opportunities, if they exist, cannot
be exploited for contractual reasons.
LNG arbitrage may also be di¢ cult because of limited shipping capacity.27 Al-
26It is also possible, in principle, to estimate the elasticity for an individual markets, k` , or the
entire vector of elasticities

k`
	M
`=1
, using econometric techniques. This would require time-series
data on prices and quantities in each market of interest (probably ideally panel data), as well as
control variables (probably including data on producerslong-term contractual commitments).
27Our model above assumed that an LNG producer takes transport costs as given when choosing
its sales strategy, and that transport is available for any desired export volume to any market.
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though there now are on the order of 400 vessels for transporting LNG, only a small
proportion of the eet is uncommitted, in the sense of not being tied to a long-term
sales contract. Thus only few companies appear to have direct access to both un-
committed gas supplies and uncommitted LNG tankers. So an LNG buyer wishing
to engage in price arbitrage may nd that the shipping market is either unable or
unwilling to provide transport at the required price.28 Note that this latter argu-
ment has some similarity to our model from above; it involves market power in the
shipping market rather than (or in addition to) the LNG market itself.29 Commis-
sioning a new LNG carrier is a costly and uncertain undertaking, with a signicant
time lag due to construction (time to build).
In addition to this, there are at least two reasons to do with vertical structure for
why arbitrage, even if possible, may not be in the interest of an LNG buyer. First,
while redirecting cargo, say, from Northwest Europe to Japan may promise a higher
price, it also means that the LNG buyer can no longer sell or use the gas further
downstream in the European market. So redirecting cargo may also forgo down-
stream surplus, which works against the incentive to arbitrage.30 Second, ownership
arrangements along the LNG supply chain are much more complex than in any sim-
ple model. Several LNG players hold partial (<100%) ownership stakes at various
points along the supply chain including in LNG production and liquefaction, ship-
ping, regasication, and downstream gas as well as across di¤erent countries. Put
simply, a company may be an LNG seller in country A, an LNG buyer in coun-
try B, and have an infrastructure stake in country C. Such a players overall prot
function and hence incentive structure is more di¢ cult to work out. However, it
Moreover, our numerical illustrations use publicly available shipping rates as being representative.
28In some cases, there may also be issues of compatibility: The existing global eet of LNG
tankers has widely varying vintages, with some vessels dating from the 1970s and some very new
tankers; vessels come in di¤erent shapes and sizes, and not all LNG import terminals are able to
receive deliveries from all types of LNG tanker.
29There is also a potential feedback e¤ect: Short-term LNG typically involves longer distances
than trade from long-term contracts, so more price arbitrage tends to further tighten the shipping
market, and may thus to some extent undermine itself. Thanks to Philipp Koenig for this point.
30We do not have data on downstream margins of integrated LNG players.
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seems plausible that the overall incentive sometimes works against arbitrage. In any
case, vertical issues mean that a simple comparison of netbacks may not be enough.
If neither LNG sellers nor LNG buyers have a strong incentive to engage in price
arbitrage, what about third parties such as traders? A recent industry report o¤ers
an interesting perspective on this question: The entry barriers to LNG trading
are surprisingly high new entrants require more than just experienced traders and
trading systems. They must have access to cargoes, but the markets liquidity is
typically held captive by the LNG liquefaction owners/upstream suppliers who are
understandably very reluctant to release volumes for traders to trade with. Traders
must also have access to shipping, either via owned vessels or the charter market.
Furthermore, certain ships can unload at certain terminals (e.g., many import ter-
minals cannot accommodate Q-Max vessels). This can make it even more di¢ cult
to e¢ ciently connect volumes to buyers (JP Morgan Cazenove, 2012). That is,
physical arbitrage requires su¢ cient capacities along the entire supply chain; almost
by denition, this is more di¢ cult for third parties to secure.
It is worth highlighting a few other considerations which, in practice, can make
LNG arbitrage di¢ cult and nancially risky and are typically neglected in models
of price discrimination. The rst is units. While the ow of gas is, in some sense,
continuous, the economics of LNG transport involves an indivisibility: the unit of
account is, in e¤ect, a tanker. As a result, only players with su¢ ciently deep
pockets can enter the market. The second is time. It can take two weeks, for
example, to ship LNG from Qatar to Japan. Given the volatility of gas prices, it
is possible for there to be a signicant shift in relative prices over such a period
of time. So risk management becomes an important factor, both for LNG sales
and potential arbitrage activity. Although nancial instruments for natural gas
exist, the derivatives market specically for LNG is relatively underdeveloped at
present. Financial arbitrage, in general, can also be a¤ected by the existence of
agency costs and capital constraints (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Acharya, Lochstoer
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and Ramadorai, 2013).
Finally, the extent of price arbitrage in international gas markets may be limited
because arbitrageurs themselves have a degree of market power. This can result
from a combination of the lumpinessof LNG trade and barriers to entry discussed
above. In such cases, the optimal way to exploit a protable trading opportunity
does not lead to prices being equalized, precisely because the arbitrageur realizes that
her actions have a non-zero e¤ect on prices.31 For example, the optimal arbitrage
strategy b  arg max f [pi ( )  pj()]g of buying  units in low-price market
j to sell in high-price market i leaves pi ( b) 6= pj(b) whenever the arbitrageur has
market power in at least one of the two markets.
Taken together, these arguments suggests that, there are signicant limits to the
scale of arbitrage activity which mean that gas price di¤erentials perhaps due to
market power in the LNG supply chain have persisted.
4 Concluding discussion
Summary of the analysis. Despite being connected by international trade in
LNG, gas prices around the world vary widely. It is particularly surprising that
large price di¤erentials have persisted for years, becoming even more pronounced
since the Fukushima accident of March 2011. Some industry observers have claimed
that LNG producers are behaving irrationally by failing to engage in international
price arbitrage. Such relative prices are also di¢ cult to reconcile with a perfectly
competitive model in which price di¤erences arise solely due to transport costs.
This paper has presented the rst attempt in the literature to address this puzzle.
It shows that observed prices and trade ows can be explained by LNG exporters
market power; indeed, it is quite di¢ cult to see how the data could be rationalized
31See also Borenstein, Bushnell, Knittel and Wolfram (2008) on pricing in Californian electricity
markets around the time of the Enron collapse; they show that arbitrage oppurtunities existed
between spot and forward markets but suggest these were left unexploited due to a combination
of market power and arbitrageursfear of regulatory penalties.
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without incorporating market power. Arbitrage by a prot-maximizing exporter
takes place by comparing marginal revenue across markets rather than only price.
Di¤erences in local demand conditions can leave prices far apart. Rough estimates
for Qatar suggest signicant market power, albeit at di¤erent levels, for the Japanese
and UK markets. We have argued that, in addition, a combination of incentives,
market power, and other constraints tends to work against international price arbi-
trage by LNG buyers and third-party traders.
Discussion of LNG market developments, and future research. So is gas a
global market? This is partly a matter of denition. Yes, in the sense that several
LNG exporters sell into almost all major markets (except the US), and thus connect
their pricing albeit imperfectly. No, in that there is currently no clear tendency
towards a single uniform gas price (even adjusted for transport costs).
Looking ahead, a number of recent developments, on balance, suggest that the
gas market may become (even) more global. Signicant low-cost capacity may
emerge in form of LNG exports based on US shale gas, as well as from Russian
export capacity. Yet other LNG projects, notably in Australia, have higher-than-
projected costs which may dampen future supply. Production is also becoming more
exible; oating liquefaction plant and tankers with onboard regasication capabil-
ities should make output more responsive to relative prices, and recent plans in
Japan to introduce LNG futures contracts would facilitate hedging and arbitrage.
A natural question therefore is, how will greater LNG arbitrage a¤ect the global
gas market? The existing theoretical literature on third-degree price discrimination
o¤ers some partial answers.32 It focuses on the e¤ect of moving from uniform
pricing, where rms are forced (e.g., by regulation) to set identical prices in all
markets, to price discrimination, where there are no such constraints on relative
prices. Turned on its head, it therefore addresses the impact of an extreme scenario:
moving from unconstrained price discrimination by LNG exporters to a world with
32Stole (2007) provides a useful overview of this literature.
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perfect, costless arbitrage and a single gas price.
Much of the literature focuses on the case of a monopoly selling into two separate
markets with di¤erent demand conditions (but identical marginal cost); see Aguirre,
Cowan and Vickers (2010) for a recent analysis. Under fairly mild conditions, the
resulting uniform price lies between the high and low prices under discrimination.
Moreover, price discrimination is usually associated with lower aggregate consumer
surplus (across both markets) although there are exceptions (Cowan, 2012).33
By revealed preference, moving to perfect arbitrage makes a monopolist worse o¤.
The situation is more complex for price-setting oligopoly, and the literature high-
lights the possibility that price discrimination may reduce industry prots (Corts,
1998). So it is at least conceivable that a shift to a global gas price might be positive
for LNG exporters (as a group). The impact of price discrimination on social welfare
is, in general, ambiguous, and depends, amongst other things, on the ne details
of the demand conditions across di¤erent markets.34 In the monopoly case, price
discrimination is often welfare-reducing but it is probably more likely to increase
welfare under oligopoly. So a move to perfect arbitrage may actually cause global
welfare to fall; in any case, it is clear that important distributional e¤ects arise.
However, the assumptions made to obtain these results limit their applicability
to gas markets. First, virtually all of the existing literature focuses on monopoly
or price-setting duopoly, neither of which seems a natural choice for LNG mar-
kets. Second, most papers simply assume that rms supply all markets regardless of
the degree of price discrimination; this precludes the possibility, for example, that
greater price arbitrage might lead to some markets becoming so unattractive to ex-
porters that they are no longer served.35 Third, it is typically assumed that each
33A smaller number of papers examine third-degree price discrimination by price-setting
oligopolies with di¤erentiated products. With symmetric rms, the basic insights from the
monopoly case carry over (Holmes, 1989). However, a richer range of outcomes is possible if
rms are asymmetric in that they do not rank di¤erent markets in the same way, that is, a market
is regarded as strongby one rm but as weakby another rm (Corts, 1998). It is then possible
that price discrimination causes prices in both markets to move in the same direction.
34See Bergemann, Brooks and Morris (2013) for a novel welfare analysis for monopoly.
35An exception is Layson (1994) who analyzes market opening in the monopoly case.
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producer has the same marginal cost for each market; this e¤ectively rules out the
existence of transport costs, which almost inevitably vary across markets.36 Fourth,
particular features of LNG market such as the existence of long-term contracting
commitments and its complex supply chain and ownership structure are not mod-
elled. Finally, from a dynamic perspective, the higher prots that rms may derive
from the ability to price discriminate can increase their incentives to invest in LNG
infrastructure in the rst place.
For future research, it would clearly be useful to have more formal results from
models of price discrimination with more realistic market structures that can be
applied to natural gas and elsewhere. Thereby, LNG markets seem a fruitful re-
search area, given their increasing importance and the relative scarcity of existing
literature. It would be particularly interesting to combine economic theory with
more extensive market data.
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